How Japan’s policy has changed over recent years with respect to “restructuring” December 5, 2013
1. The context governing the labor society in Japan
・The labor society in Japan is governed by constitutive principles that are different from those ruling over labor societies in EU countries.
・In the main stream of Japan’s labor society (relating principally to regular employees at large- and medium-sized companies) the employment relationship between a company and its employees is not based on “jobs” but on the “membership.” The employment contract is a mere “blank slate” and each employee is required to perform various sorts of “jobs” pursuant to company orders.
・For the above reason, a transition from education to work is an “inclusion into membership” rather than a “job placement.”
・A dismissal for an economic reason, therefore, means an “exclusion from membership” rather than a “job displacement.”
(Supplementary explanations)
・There also exists in Japan a “job”-based labor society as in the cases of medical doctors and professional drivers. But they belong to minority groups. Another notable aspect of Japan’s labor society is that among medium- or small-sized companies (“SMEs”) the nature of membership becomes gradually thinner as they become smaller.
・Such a contrast between Japan and EU countries becomes clearly visible in the case of a business transfer. The basic rule under the applicable EU directive urges an employee to move to another company following his/her job. But in Japan the application of such a rule is strongly objected (the case of IBM Japan).
2. How a membership-based society copes with a business fluctuation
・Japan, too, lives a market economy. It is subject to a business fluctuation. A change in its industrial structure causes demand for labor in each individual “job” to change.
・Here we should note that the employment relationship in Japan is not based upon “jobs” and therefore the loss of a “job” does not necessarily result in the termination of an employment relationship. Under the Japanese rule a company is required to keep the employment relationship with the employee, whose job has been slashed, by relocating him/her to another “job” that may be available in the company. (In this case the newly assigned job may not be a job of the same or similar type. There are many cases where an employee is transferred from a production process at a plant to a sales department within the same company.)
・Such a job shift is permitted as an obligatory effort aimed at avoiding dismissal under the legal principle governing dismissal for economic reason adopted in the court precedents.
・Since the mid-1970s the Japanese government (labor administration) has kept pushing ahead with an employment policy that places top priority on the maintenance of employment.
・The policy has certain significance in that it mitigates social pains resulting from a “job displacement.”
・However, this may conversely mean that a dismissal due to a compelling economic reason is not taken as a “job displacement” (not attributable to himself/herself), but is stigmatize as a “exclusion from a company” because of his/her incompetence of performing any “job” in the company. (In Japan, the displacement of a redundant worker is made as a dismissal due to his/her deficient capabilities)
・The legal principle governing dismissal for economic reason in Japan substantially encourages companies to avoid dismissal, but it is lacking in any such well-defined criteria as are adopted in EU countries that shall serve to determine to-be-dismissed employees. The Japanese principle rather tends to encourage the dismissal of middle-aged or older employees.
・Such a situation works to curb dismissal of redundant workforce, causing big businesses in need of downsizing employment to cut back workforce by soliciting voluntary resignation avoiding dismissal as far as possible.
3. Non-regular employees as buffer materials against a business fluctuation and the change in their nature
・A mechanism to protect an employee’s “membership” from unavoidable business fluctuations will require his/her employer’s internal flexibility, such as reduction of overtime work and relocations, as well as its external flexibility to reduce the workforce itself. In the case of Japan, such external flexibility has been applied principally to non-regular employees (part-time, fixed-term and temporary agency workers, etc.).
・Such a mechanism can be deemed as a discrimination in the labor market, but it has not been considered as a problem in the macro society until recent years.
・The reason for the above is that a majority of non-regular employees is composed of housewives, students and other people who work to help their household economy only to a subsidiary extent. If the Japanese economy dips into a slump they withdraw from the labor market and live as dependent family members of regular workers who are protected as “members” of the company that employs them (under the above policy designed for maintaining employment) and sustain their household economy.
・Consequently, although many of the non-regular workers were terminated from employment in an economic slump, a greater part of such workers turned into non-workforce and therefore did not immediately contribute to a higher unemployment rate.
・Since the mid-1990s, however, the number of non-regular workers who are expected to sustain households has been on the increase, principally among younger people. In the 2000s, all such younger people were gradually growing into older generations (non-regular workers turning middle-aged).
・When the 2008 Lehman crisis caused lots of non-regular workers to be terminated from employment, a fairly large portion of such people were thrown out of companies totally jobless. They required policy measures that should provide them with jobs.
4. The “employment maintenance” policy predicated upon a membership-type society
・Even if a country is governed by a “job”-based society, it often seeks to avoid, as far as possible, “job displacement” due particularly to a cyclical business fluctuation, by adopting a policy designed to maintain employment. Such a policy is likely to be adopted, particularly in Germany, France and some other countries in the European Continent. As part of such policies they implement reduced working hours under work-sharing programs.
・In Japan, in 1975 the government implemented “Employment Adjustment Subsidy,” which are aimed at covering a certain proportion of wages to be paid by companies that maintain employment in the face of shrinking business activities resulting from a business fluctuation or any change occurring in the industrial structure. This plan finds its roots in the “Kurzarbeitergeld” adopted in Germany (1969).
・Since the second half of the 1970s, Japan has managed its employment policy giving top priority to maintaining employment by providing employment adjustment subsidies. Such policy management should not necessarily be deemed a problem; it should be pointed out, however, that a policy giving priority to maintaining employment in a society that is not based on “jobs” tends to make little of “jobs” because the policy seeks to maintain employees’ “membership.”
・The policy aimed at maintaining “jobless” employment in a Japanese fashion is surely effective for keeping the unemployment rate lower than in European countries and the United States and therefore is an effective employment policy in the sense that, thanks to the subsidies provided by the government, it prevents companies from creating unemployed people as much as it can (helped by government subsidies).
・At the same time, however, such a policy makes it difficult for those who were unfortunately displaced (because their employers could no longer keep them employed) to find jobs upon the recovery of the economy.
・In the case of Europe or the United States, if a worker was displaced because of a reduced number of “jobs” in an economic slump, then it will be possible for the worker to “return to the job” if “jobs” increase following an economic recovery. Older jobless people will have a greater advantage in finding new “jobs” than less skilled younger people.
・However, in the case of Japan, workers were left displaced after their employers made all possible efforts to keep them employed, until finally all possible “jobs” were exhausted. Then, a displaced worker carries a stigma in the sense that his/her being unemployed means he/she is incapable of any kind of a “job”. So it becomes quite difficult for the worker to find a new job. Precisely for this reason, Japan’s long-term unemployment rate is fairly high despite its relatively low unemployment rate. (Different from the cases of European countries, the unemployed people in Japan including middle-aged and older people are paid unemployment benefits that do not exceed one year. Consequently, Japan’s high long-term unemployment rate is not attributable to unemployment benefits.)
5. How employment policies have changed in Japan
・The employment policies adopted in Japan have not always given priority to maintaining employment; rather, Japan’s employment policies have kept swinging between promotion of labor mobility and employment maintenance.
・Since the latter 1950s through the 1960s and the early 1970s, the Japanese government adopted a policy designed to encourage employment mobility. The 1960 Income-Doubling Plan and the 1967 Employment Plan were both aimed at developing a “labor market based on skills and jobs.” Principal subsidies offered were job-change benefits.
・To cope with the impact of the 1973 oil crisis, in and after 1975 the government adopted a full-fledged employment maintenance policy using the above-mentioned employment adjustment subsidy. The policy, combined with the four requirements for a dismissal for economic reason adopted by the court at that time, prompted a corporate behavior to be established (principally among large- and medium-sized enterprises) towards avoiding as far as possible “exclusion from membership.” Thereafter, over the 1980s through the early 1990s Japan enjoyed an exceptionally low unemployment rate among advanced economies.
・The early 1990s saw the so-called bubble collapse. It gave rise to a slumping economy and caused redundant workforce to be increasingly felt among companies, resulting in a gradual increase in the unemloyment rate. Such a new situation led the government to correct its policy that sought to prioritize employment maintenance. The policy slogan then adopted by the government was “labor mobility without unemployment,” which sought to have employees directly transferred from one company to another by means of a secondment or other measures without experiencing unemployment.
・Because of the 2000 revision of the law, companies downsizing their business were now required to draw up a “plan to assist employees in getting reemployed” instead of the thus far adopted “employment maintenance plan.” In keeping with such a change, government subsidies were now changed to support outplacement.
・To cope with the impact of the 2008 Lehman crisis, the government eased the requirements for employment adjustment subsidy. A lot of companies began to make use of the eased subsidy, causing the employment maintenance policy to again be a central policy.
・In 2013, the new government advocated a policy for (re-)shift from employment maintenance to promotion of labor mobility. The government intends to provide the labor mobility support subsidy in an amount larger than for the employment adjustment subsidy. The government also is considering providing support to “re-learning.”
6. Brief summary and conclusion
・Corporate behaviors and employment policies giving priority to maintaining “membership” over “job”-based employment has long contributed to keeping Japan’s unemployment rate at a low level.
・It has become notable, however, that people who are not saved by such a policy have greater difficulty in securing the “membership” of another company. It will result in a higher rate of long-term unemployment. There has actually been an increase in this part of unemployment.
・Contrastingly, the European/U.S.-type employment policy adopted by Japan in recent years (which are focused on education and training provided outside companies) becomes less effective, particularly in the area of large-sized companies, when it becomes increasingly “job”-based.
・That said, if the government weakens the mechanism designed for employment maintenance that is actually serving to rein in unemployment and seeks to increase the effect of such “job”-based policies, it may, on the contrary, raise the unemployment rate.
・Thus, Japan’s employment policy now finds itself in a paradoxical situation. It is difficult to get to a conclusion in a simple-minded manner (as do many pundits or commentators).
もともと製造業をモデルに物的生産性で考えていたわけだけど、ロットで計ってたんでは自動車と電機の比較もできないし、技術進歩でたくさん作れるようになったというだけじゃなくて性能が上がったというのも計りたいから、結局値段で計ることになったわけですね。価値生産性という奴です。
価値生産性というのは値段で計るわけだから、値段が上がれば生産性が上がったことになるわけです。売れなきゃいつまでも高い値段を付けていられないから、まあ生産性を計るのにおおむね間違いではない、と製造業であればいえるでしょう。だけど、サービス業というのは労働供給即商品で加工過程はないわけだから、床屋さんでもメイドさんでもいいけど、労働市場で調達可能な給料を賄うためにサービス価格が上がれば生産性が上がったことになるわけですよ。日本国内で生身でサービスを提供する労働者の限界生産性は、途上国で同じサービスを提供する人のそれより高いということになるわけです。
どうもここんところが誤解されているような気がします。日本と途上国で同じ水準のサービスをしているんであれば、同じ生産性だという物的生産性概念で議論しているから混乱しているんではないのでしょうか。
>ていうか、そもそもサービス業の物的生産性って何で計るの?という大問題があるわけですよ。
価値生産性で考えればそこはスルーできるけど、逆に高い金出して買う客がいる限り生産性は高いと言わざるを得ない。
生身のカラダが必要なサービス業である限り、そもそも場所的なサービス提供者調達可能性抜きに生産性を議論できないはずです。
ここが、例えばインドのソフトウェア技術者にネットで仕事をやらせるというようなアタマの中味だけ持ってくれば済むサービス業と違うところでしょう。それはむしろ製造業に近いと思います。
そういうサービス業については生産性向上という議論は意味があると思うけれども、生身のカラダのサービス業にどれくらい意味があるかってことです(もっとも、技術進歩で、生身のカラダを持って行かなくてもそういうサービスが可能になることがないとは言えませんけど)。
>いやいや、製造業だろうが何だろうが、労働は生身の人間がやってるわけです。しかし、労働の結果はモノとして労働力とは切り離して売買されるから、単一のマーケットでついた値段で価値生産性を計れば、それが物的生産性の大体の指標になりうるわけでしょう。インドのソフトウェアサービスもそうですね。
しかし、生身のカラダ抜きにやれないサービスの場合、生身のサービス提供者がいるところでついた値段しか拠り所がないでしょうということを言いたいわけで。カラダをおいといてサービスの結果だけ持っていけないでしょう。
いくらフィクションといったって、フィリピン人の看護婦がフィリピンにいるままで日本の患者の面倒を見られない以上、場所の入れ替えに意味があるとは思えません。ただ、サービス業がより知的精神的なものになればなるほど、こういう場所的制約は薄れては行くでしょうね。医者の診断なんてのは、そうなっていく可能性はあるかも知れません。そのことは否定していませんよ。
>フィリピン人のウェイトレスさんを日本に連れてきてサービスして貰うためには、(合法的な外国人労働としてという前提での話ですが)日本の家に住み、日本の食事を食べ、日本の生活費をかけて労働力を再生産しなければならないのですから、フィリピンでかかる費用ではすまないですよ。パスポートを取り上げてタコ部屋に押し込めて働かせることを前提にしてはいけません。
もちろん、際限なくフィリピンの若い女性が悉く日本にやってくるまで行けば、長期的にはウェイトレスのサービス価格がフィリピンと同じまで行くかも知れないけれど、それはウェイトレスの価値生産性が下がったというしかないわけです。以前と同じことをしていてもね。しかしそれはあまりに非現実的な想定でしょう。
要するに、生産性という概念は比較活用できる概念としては価値生産性、つまり最終的についた値段で判断するしかないでしょう、ということであって。
>いやいや、労働生産性としての物的生産性の話なのですから、労働者(正確には組織体としての労働者集団ですが)の生産性ですよ。企業の資本生産性の話ではなかったはず。
製造業やそれに類する産業の場合、労務サービスと生産された商品は切り離されて取引されますから、国際的にその品質に応じて値段が付いて、それに基づいて価値生産性を測れば、それが物的生産性の指標になるわけでしょう。
ところが、労務サービス即商品である場合、当該労務サービスを提供する人とそれを消費する人が同じ空間にいなければならないので、当該労務サービスを消費できる人が物的生産性の高い人やその関係者であってサービスに高い値段を付けられるならば、当該労務サービスの価値生産性は高くなり、当該労務サービスを消費できる人が物的生産性の低い人やその関係者であってサービスに高い価格をつけられないならば、当該労務サービスの価値生産性は低くなると言うことです。
そして、労務サービスの場合、この価値生産性以外に、ナマの(貨幣価値を抜きにした)物的生産性をあれこれ論ずる意味はないのです。おなじ行為をしているじゃないかというのは、その行為を消費する人が同じである可能性がない限り意味がない。
そういう話を不用意な設定で議論しようとするから、某開発経済実務家の方も、某テレビ局出身情報経済専門家の方も、へんちくりんな方向に迷走していくんだと思うのですよ。
>まあ、製造業の高い物的生産性が国内で提供されるサービスにも均霑して高い価値生産性を示すという点は正しいわけですから。
問題は、それを、誰がどうやって計ればいいのか分からない、単位も不明なサービスの物的生産性という「本質」をまず設定して、それは本当は低いんだけれども、製造業の高い物的生産性と「平均」されて、本当の水準よりも高く「現象」するんだというような説明をしなければならない理由が明らかでないということですから。
それに、サービスの価値生産性が高いのは、製造業の物的生産性が高い国だけじゃなくって、石油がドバドバ噴き出て、寝そべっていてもカネが流れ込んでくる国もそうなわけで、その場合、原油が噴き出すという「高い生産性」と平均されるという説明になるのでしょうかね。
いずれにしても、サービスの生産性を高めるのはそれがどの国で提供されるかということであって、誰が提供するかではありません。フィリピン人メイドがフィリピンで提供するサービスは生産性が低く、ヨーロッパやアラブ産油国で提供するサービスは生産性が高いわけです。そこも、何となく誤解されている点のような気がします。
>大体、もともと「生産性」という言葉は、工場の中で生産性向上運動というような極めてミクロなレベルで使われていた言葉です。そういうミクロなレベルでは大変有意味な言葉ではあった。
だけど、それをマクロな国民経済に不用意に持ち込むと、今回の山形さんや池田さんのようなお馬鹿な騒ぎを引き起こす原因になる。マクロ経済において意味を持つ「生産性」とは値段で計った価値生産性以外にはあり得ない。
とすれば、その価値生産性とは財やサービスを売って得られた所得水準そのものなので、ほとんどトートロジーの世界になるわけです。というか、トートロジーとしてのみ意味がある。そこに個々のサービスの(値段とは切り離された本質的な)物的生産性が高いだの低いだのという無意味な議論を持ち込むと、見ての通りの空騒ぎしか残らない。
>いや、実質所得に意味があるのは、モノで考えているからでしょう。モノであれば、時間空間を超えて流通しますから、特定の時空間における値段のむこうに実質価値を想定しうるし、それとの比較で単なる値段の上昇という概念も意味がある。
逆に言えば、サービスの値段が上がったときに、それが「サービスの物的生産性が向上したからそれにともなって値段が上がった」と考えるのか、「サービス自体はなんら変わっていないのに、ただ値段が上昇した」と考えるのか、最終的な決め手はないのではないでしょうか。
このあたり、例の生産性上昇率格差インフレの議論の根っこにある議論ですよね。